12 Critiques of Howard Gardner's Theory of Multiple Intelligences</B></FONT>

Critiques of Howard Earl Gardner's Multiple Intelligences Theory

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Go here to see my cvBefore viewing a series of comments by various long-established writers and professors who (continue to) disagree with Howard Earl Gardner's (HEG) multiple intelligences theory (MIT), here are a few comment about me and why I continue to remark on a model of the human mind that is too good to drop!  And for those interested in more about me, click on my image.

I first heard about HEG's MIT in 1985 when I was a practicing classroom teacher.  Since 1966 I had been employed by various state-funded public-school boards as an elementary school principal, an elementary and high school regular and special education instructor.  Throughout, I was well-positioned to view the behaviour and learning modes of many youngsters.  For example and for the purpose of this discussion, I observed that a large number of pupils failed to pay close attention to classroom subject instruction, were often unfocused, unable to retain information, and did not know how to best study for unit tests and / or term examinations.  In short, and to reinforce the research literature of the day, I noticed that not all students grasped and retained domain-specific content in the same 'uniform' way.

* * * * * *

Many have been critical of HEG's MIT.  His notion that all of us have many intelligences has come under severe attack.  They perceive his 'theory' less a scientific theory than a line on which he supposedly hangs out his 'intellectual laundry.'  Instead of a full fledged, substantiated theory, such critics 'see' his efforts as often simply construed efforts to represent a general framework, or taxonomy.  Still others believe that Gardner ignores the evidence and does not deal well with the concept of 'g', or general intelligence.  Nor do they feel that he deals with the view of mental ability held by the majority of working psychologists, namely the hierarchical model, a general factor supplemented by numerous special mental abilities or group factors.  According to them, HEG adheres to what psychometricians would simply label a multiple factor model.

Here is what some of them have to say about his MIT.

Brody, Nathan

1992.  Intelligence.  2nd ed.  New York: Academic Press.  In his evaluation of what he simply terms a taxonomy, Brody argues, at some length, that HEG's "list of intelligences is arbitrary, and that his attempt to restructure the theory of intelligence to omit a general factor is no more successful than the attempts of psychometric theorists to dispense with g" (p. 36).  Brody fails to see how Gardner's eight (8) criteria leads to the set of intelligences that he posits. Moreover, Brody has problems with HEG's evidence of the independence of intelligences resulting from HEG's study of 'rare' cases of prodigies and savants, to name just two.  And Brody feels that "the independent functioning of intelligences following brain damage may be of little relevance to understand the performance of intact individuals" (p. 29).

Here, the reader sees two (2) well-respected theorists of intelligence (Robert Sternberg and Nathan Brody) finding Gardner's taxonomy to be without empirical foundation, and thus subject to extreme judgment.  Gardner (1993) has been the first to admit that his "intelligences are fictions -- at most, useful fictions -- for identifying processes and abilities that (like all of life) are continuous with one another" (p. 70).  In defense of Howard Earle, I must point out that the field of developmental cognitive science (DCS) is a new, young, and growing field and that all evidence should thus be taken as tentative rather than definite.  In DCS, researchers continue to hypothesize about the existence of 100 distinct areas in the cerebral cortex, still trying to shade them, to ascertain their identities, and to see how they connect with each another.

Bouchard, Thomas, J. Jr.

July 20, 1984.  Review of Frames of Mind: The theory of multiple intelligences.  American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 54, 506-508.

Carroll, John, B.

1993  Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor-analytic studies. New York: Cambridge University Press.  Here, Carroll finds it interesting "that the kinds of 'intelligences' described by Gardner show a fairly close correspondence with the broad domains of ability" as suggested by Raymond Cattell and John Horn.  For example, Carroll believes that Gardner's linguistic intelligence corresponds closely to the concepts of Cattell and Horn's crystallized intelligence.  Carroll also views Gardner's logical-mathematical and visual-spatial intelligence suspiciously similar to the concept of fluid intelligence and visual perception, respectively (p. 641; for a similar critique, see Bouchard 1984, p. 507).

Carson, Andrew

To read how Carson cites five (5) reasons "for why vocational psychologists have largely ignored Gardner's work in general and his MI theory in particular", click here.

Ceci, Steven

Ceci, a developmental psychologist at Cornell, praises Gardner as "a wonderful communicator" who has publicized "a much more egalitarian view of intelligence." But he points out that Gardner's approach of constructing criteria and then running candidate intelligences through them, while suggestive, provides no hard evidence -- no test results, for example -- that his colleagues could evaluate. Ceci adds: "The neurological data show that the brain is modular, but that does not address the issue of whether all these things are correlated or not." Track-and-field athletes, he notes, may have special gifts in one particular event, but they will score better than the average person on every event. Psychological tests show the same kind of correlation. ..." (p. 1)

Darius, Julian

Against Gardner  February 18, 2003.  An essay critiquing HEG's MIT  To read his complete comments, go to http://www.persiancaesar.com/ApollonianBacchanalia47.htm   As I am unable to summarize Darius accurately, I shall quote his directly.  Here is part of what he stated in his column at that time:

" ... But the most damaging element of Gardner’s taxonomies is not his particular choices -- which should not be taken all so seriously, though they often are -- but the labeling of all such elements as “intelligences.” Previous eras and generations did not ignore the awe-inspiring abilities of athletes and musicians and interpersonal schmoozers, but they called such things “abilities” or “aptitudes” instead of “intelligences.” As the child prodigy circuit from which he benefited demonstrates, no one doubted Mozart was a genius, though they wouldn’t come to him for political advice. He was certainly, in a way, intelligent -- but “intelligence” denotes things at which he wasn’t all that gifted, and we might better speak of his tremendous musical genius, or talent, or aptitude. In other words, outside of a tentative and problematic taxonomy, and his sometimes appalling self-reflexive theory of this taxonomy’s implications, Gardner’s great contribution was not at all to demonstrate anything new but to expand the definition of “intelligence” as a word.

... Gardner’s theory, largely lacking in evidence and easily deconstructed, has become a staple of educational theory and even our thinking about the nature of the mind and what constitutes “intelligence.” This has little to do with the substance of his work, which at best provides a working but limited taxonomy and a reminder that the brain and the various talents of humanity are separate from any narrow definition of intelligence. Rather, the success of the theory of multiple intelligences has everything to do with its cultural context: a democracy infatuated with the rhetoric of egalitarianism that abhors the hierarchy implicit in the elitism of intelligence, a culture concerned for minorities who continuously perform poorer in evaluations of intelligence, and a culture of increasingly entrenched anti-intellectualism, fanaticism for sports, and relativism of the worst, dumbest sort. The popularity of the theory of multiple intelligences says far more about contemporary American culture than it does about intelligence, of which it says almost nothing.

... This, then, is Gardner’s real agenda. And he has made a prosperous career out of it. Ironically, he has done so through conventional intelligence -- through the old definitions of intelligence that got him his degrees and his job at the (often ridiculously) overly traditional Harvard. Gardner has promulgated his theories through the same old linguistic intelligence that his own theory relegates to the equivalent of throwing balls through hoops. Yet in selling out the academic standards and the definition of intelligence that got him where he is and that labeled him intelligent in the first place, Gardner has purchased in exchange not only his fame but his placement in undergraduate anthologies -- which might compensate him, if not his colleagues, when that lonely compensation of his special status as intelligent in an anti-intellectual society is stripped from him.

Howard Gardner’s popular theory has made him, in his effects if not his intensions, a traitor not only to the academy but some two and a half millennia of learning. Such is the power of a single word, calamitous in its misuse."

Eysenck, M. W.

(1994).  Intelligence.  In M. W. Eysenck, (Ed.), The Blackwell dictionary of cognitive psychology  (pp. 192-193).  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. In this commentary, Eysenck severely criticized HEG for confounding talents and abilities with intelligence.

Gardner, Howard

1994  Multiple intelligences theory.  In Robert Jeffrey Sternberg  (Ed.),  Encyclopedia of human intelligence (Vol. 2, pp. 740-742).  New York: Macmillan.  Here we read HEG being critical of his own MIT.  Note especially how he comments that his model does not incorporate specifying underlying executive processes.  Click on the thumbnail on the right to view an enlarged image of part of what he wrote on page 741.

Fodor, Jerry

1983  The modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT / Bradford Press and his March, 1985  Précis of the modularity of mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(1), 1-42.  In these two (2) writings, Fodor claims that Gardner rejects a central processor form of intelligence that cuts across his eight (8) separate modules.  In its stead, Fodor defends the now standard consensus of brain localization, the modularity of mind -- a theory holding that the different forms of human intelligence occupy separate areas of the brain.

Guskin, S. L. Peng, C. J., & Simon, M.

Winter 1992.  Do teachers react to "multiple intelligences"?  Effects of teachers' stereotypes on judgments and expectancies for students with diverse patterns of giftedness/talent.  Gifted Child Quarterly, 36(1), 32-37.

Klein, Perry, D.

(Autumn, 1997).  Multiplying the problems of intelligence by eight: A critique of Gardner's theory.  Canadian Journal of Education, 22(4), 377-394. Here is the abstract of Klein's article.  Howard Gardner has theorized that the mind comprises eight intelligences. Multiple intelligence theory has inspired educational innovations across North America, but has received little critical analysis. I contend that Gardner is on the horns of a dilemma. A "weak" version of multi ple intelligence theory would be uninteresting, whereas a "strong" version is not adequately supported by the evidence Gardner presents. Pedagogically, multiple intelligence theory has inspired diverse practices, including balanced programming, matching instruction to learning styles, and student specialization. However, the theory shares the limitations of general intelligence theory: it is too broad to be useful for planning curriculum, and as a theory of ability, it presents a static view of student competence. Research on the knowledge and strategies that learners use in specific activities, and on how they construct this knowledge, may prove more relevant to classroom practice.

Gardner, Howard.  (1998).  A Reply to Perry D. Klein's "Multiplying the problems of intelligence by eight".  Canadian Journal of Education, 23(1), 96-102.

Klein, Perry, D.  (1998).  A response to Howard Gardner: Falsifibality, empirical evidence, and pedagogical usefulness in educational psychology.  Canadian Journal of Education, 23(1), 103-112.

Matthews, Donna

(1988, December).  Gardner's multiple intelligence theory: An evaluation of relevant research literature and a consideration of its application to gifted education. Roeper Review, 11(2), 100-104.  In this article,  Matthews comments that while Gardner's MI model is practical and theoretically appealing, this quality alone cannot validate the theory.

McGuinness, Keith

@ http://www.nswagtc.org.au/info/articles/McGuinessMultIntellig.html comments on Howard Gardner's ideas. Here is part of what he said:

" ... Gardner himself had a specific reason for calling the qualities he identified "intelligences". He wrote: "In delineating a narrow definition of intelligence, however, one usually devalues those capacities that are not within that definition's purview: thus, dancers or chess players may be talented but they are not smart.

There are three points I would like to make about this statement. First, Gardner's conclusion is, obviously, incorrect: dancers and chess players can be talented AND smart. Second, in our society, talents seem to be valued (or at least applauded) more readily than intelligence. Third, as most people know, redefining a word to have a meaning at odds with current usage is a common practice in political or social debate: it is, in my experience, rarely done to enlighten, usually to confuse (e g killing civilians becomes "collateral damage")."

Miller, George

George Miller, the esteemed psychologist credited with discovering the mechanisms by which short-term memory operates, wrote in The New York Times Book Review that Gardner's argument boiled down to "hunch and opinion" (see p. 20).  And Gardner's subsequent work has done very little to shift the balance of opinion.

Morgan, Harry

(1992).  An analysis of Gardner's theory of multiple intelligence.  Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of The Eastern Educational Research Association.  (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No.  ED 360 088) In this paper, Morgan contended that Gardner's index of intelligences bore striking resemblance to cognitive style constructs and intelligence quotient factors identified by others in unified theories of intelligence.  Morgan stated that MI theory merely adapted factors identified as primary abilities in factor analyses of data derived from intelligence tests and re-labeled them as intelligences.  Morgan reviewed the literature on cognitive styles.  His findings suggested numerous similarities between MI framework and styles of cognition.  For example, Morgan interpreted Gardner's logical-mathematical intelligence as being applied to those who are simply sensitive to logical or numerical patterns and thus have the ability to handle long chains of reasoning and whose ideal careers are scientists or mathematicians.  That is, Morgan saw Gardner's characteristics as compatible with the cognitive styles identified as field independent and also with numerical ability, one of the factors identified by intelligence factor analysis.  To sum, Morgan agreed that single factor constructs of intelligence have certainly been invalidated by current research; however, he failed to see how the label of separate intelligences for aspects of cognition could be warranted.

Peterson, K. S.

(1997).  Do new definitions of smart dilute meaning?  USA Today, pp. D1-D2

Richardson, Ken.

(1991).  Understanding Intelligence.  Philadelphia: Open University Press.  Gardner's inattentiveness to the scientific method has also been contested.  Here, Richardson feels that the MI 'theory' seems to be "more a pragmatic framework for accentuating the individual strengths that children currently have, and as a rationale for providing programs of activity within the different intellectual domains" (p. 145). And during a review of Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Action, Fred Smolucha (1993) commented that Gardner has simply coined a new term "subjective" factor analysis as his excuse for lack of statistical data supporting his "theory" (p. 368; and for a similar critique, see Kline, 1991, p. 137).

Seebach, Linda

2004.05.21  Scoping out multiple intelligences  Scripps Howard News Service

@ http://www.shns.com/shns/g_index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=SEEBACH-05-21-04

Sempsey, James

October 19, 1993.  The Pedagogical Implications Of Cognitive Science and Howard Gardner's M.I. Theory (A Critique).  This paper briefly assesses some of the pedagogical implications of Gardner's work.  Simply stated for here, Sempsey insists that Gardner’s theory is too broad and can be abused.  To cite Sempsey directly: "Since our national culture is supposed to become increasingly multi-cultural, could not any individual pick and chose between various sub-culturally valued competencies and then proclaim their own unique set of abilities as equally legitimate to any other set?,”  And “To define intelligence in terms of culturally relative values is to deny the intrinsic value (or even existence) of higher orders of organization. If intelligence can only be subjectively valued, then ultimately intelligence has no true value and perhaps never existed to begin with."

Sternberg, Robert Jeffrey

(1983, Winter).  How much Gall is too much gall?  [Review of Frames of Mind: The theory of multiple intelligences]. Contemporary Education Review, 2(3), 215-224.  In what was perhaps one of THE earliest book reviews of HEG's Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences, Sternberg cites three reasons why he serious doubts the validity of the MIT model (see p. 220).  They are:

  1. HEG's reliance on Gall's faculty psychology
  2. HEG's usage of the term multiple intelligence and not multiple talents
  3. The overall structure of HEG's MIT framework (see especially pp. 220-222). 

Sternberg, R. J.

(1988).  The triarchic mind: A new theory of human intelligence.  New York: Penguin Books.  Here, Sternberg is unclear as to "exactly what each intelligence consists of, because HEG's theory, like other map-based theories, does not specify processes. In other words, it is one thing to identify a linguistic intelligence but quite another to specify the underlying processes.  How do we read, learn vocabulary, write prose or poetry, produce oral speech, summarize, and so on?  HEG's theory names the so-called intelligences without pinning down just what they are (and aren't)" (p. 42).

Sternberg continues his critique of HEG by calling Gardner's MIT model "a theory of talents, not one of intelligences" (p. 42).  Sternberg sees the difference between talent and intelligence as qualitative by stating "[I]ntelligence is general: without it we cannot function independently.  Talents, however, are specialized" (p. 42).

Sternberg, R. J.

(1991). Death, taxes, and bad intelligence tests.  Intelligence, 15(3), 257-270.  Here, Sternberg writes that bad intelligence tests seem as inescapable as death and taxes. However, new theories of intelligence are resulting in some promising developments. Sternberg describes thirteen (13) approaches to the measurement of intelligence; he divides then into the following categories: classical psychometric; developmental; culture-sensitive; cognitive; biological; and systems. And, like others, Sternberg criticizes HEG for confounding talents and abilities with intelligence.

Sternberg, R. J. and Frensch, P. A.

(1990).  Intelligence and cognition.  In M. W. Eysenck (Ed.), International review of cognitive psychology. Chichester: Wiley.  In critiquing HEG's MIT, Sternberg and Frensch write that "it seems strange to describe someone who is tone deaf or physically uncoordinated as unintelligent" (p. 193).  But in defense, Gardner believes that if spatial or musical ability must be called a "talent", then language and logic must be called merely a talent as well.  I'm going to give HEG the final word here when he comments "I balk at the unwarranted assumption that certain human abilities can be arbitrarily singled out as intelligence while others cannot" (Peterson, 1997, p. D2).

Scarr, Sandra

(1985).  An author's frame of mind  [Review of Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences].  New Ideas in Psychology, 3(1), 95-100.  Here, Scarr severely critiques HEG for confusing talents and abilities with intelligence.

Shafer, Barbara

Shafer comments that parents have concerns over the implementation of HEG's MIT in public schools.

Smerechansky-Metzger, Jean, A

(1995, May-June).  The quest for multiple intelligences.  Gifted Child Today, 18(3), 12-15.  For the MI model to be successful and validated, educators, especially classroom teachers, must "begin to open their minds to the possibilities surrounding the [MI] concept" (p. 14).

Theiler, Janine

(2006).  A Comparative Study: Ericsson's Theory of Expertise and Gardner's Theory of Multiple Intelligences.  University of Nebraska at Lincoln.  In this comparative commentary, Theiler discusses an explorative study whereby Howard Gardner's Theory of Multiple Intelligences was matched with Anders Ericsson's Expertise Theory.  Throughout the comparative analysis, the Gardner model is once again somewhat sneered.

Traub, James

1998, October 26.  Multiple intelligence disorder, The New Republic, pp. 20-23.  Here, Traub comments that the scientific establishment has never fully accepted HEG's MIT on intellectual quotient (IQ). He writes that this has not stopped educators from using Gardner's teachings to transform American schools.  Here are two (2) quotes from that article.  To grasp Traub's complete message, the more interested reader is referred to the complete article, as referenced above.  As I do not plan to summarize Traub exactly, I here cite him directly:

"In the 15 years since the publication of Gardner's Frames of Mind, multiple intelligences has gone from being a widely disputed theory to a rallying cry for school reformers to a cultural commonplace.  And, amazingly, it has done so without ever winning over the scientific establishment."

"Gardner's central claim is that what we normally think of as intelligence is merely a single aspect, or two aspects, of a much wider range of aptitudes; he has counted eight so far.  Thus, we have exalted the attribute measured by IQ tests -- the hyperlogical style Gardner half jokingly calls the "Alan Dershowitz" model of intelligence -- and have slighted our creative and interpersonal gifts.  Of course, the primary question about this theory is whether or not it's true" (p. 20).

"Gardner failed to persuade his peers. George Miller, the esteemed psychologist credited with discovering the mechanisms by which short term memory operates, wrote in The New York Times Book Review that Gardner's argument boiled down to "hunch and opinion" (p. 20). And Gardner's subsequent work has done very little to shift the balance of opinion. A recent issue of Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, devoted to the overall study of human intelligence, contained virtually no reference to Gardner's work. Most people who study intelligence view M.I. theory as rhetoric rather than science, and they're divided on the virtues of the rhetoric. Steven Ceci, a developmental psychologist at Cornell, praises Gardner as "a wonderful communicator" who has publicized "a much more egalitarian view of intelligence." But he points out that Gardner's approach of constructing criteria and then running candidate intelligences through them, while suggestive, provides no hard evidence -- no test results, for example -- that his colleagues could evaluate. Ceci adds: "The neurological data show that the brain is modular, but that does not address the issue of whether all these things are correlated or not." Track-and-field athletes, he notes, may have special gifts in one particular event, but they will score better than the average person on every event. Psychological tests show the same kind of correlation (p. 20)."

Willingham, Daniel T.

Summer 2004, 4(3).  To read his comment, go to http://www.hoover.org/publications/ednext/3261311.html


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Recently revised by Clifford Morris on Sunday, 06 January, 2008