|
CHAPTER
TWO
"Shoot
at that Muslim": David and Goliath at Mwembechai
We ordained for the Children of
Israel that if anyone slew a person-- unless it be for murder or for spreading
mischief in the land-- it would be as if he slew the whole people: And
if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole
people.
Qur'an, 5:32
Let me begin this chapter with an old
story which is available in several versions. According to one version,
an old grandmother upon hearing that her grand-daughter was bitten by a
deadly snake and had died, she screamed and wailed loudly, "Oh, I have
killed my grand-daughter, Oh, my God! I am responsible for her death."
When people insisted that she was not to blame because the girl had died
of snake poison, she said, "I am responsible for her death because I am
the one who gave birth to her mother. Had I not given birth to her mother,
her mother would not have given birth to her. And had she not given birth
to her she would not have been bitten by the deadly snake and she would
not have died"!
The killings which took place at
Mwembechai were a culmination of a long history, and our grandmother is
certainly responsible. However, our present interest in this chapter is
to look at the immediate circumstances surrounding the death of the young
girl and to find out who let loose the deadly snake and who allowed it
to strike.
Count
down to the killings
It was in the afternoon of 13 February,
1998 that policemen armed with live ammunition were ordered to open fire
at the people who were outside the Mwembechai mosque. From the video tape
of the shooting at least four people were killed and many others maimed.
It is also quite clear from the tape that the aim was to kill the Muslims.
In the tape the police commanders are seen and heard ordering their armed
policemen to take careful aim of their targets. In two cases the first
bullets wounded without killing the intended victims, and the police commander
in both cases ordered his men to shoot again. And they did, with unmistakable
zest and ruthlessness. The tape also shows the police dragging the bodies
of the dead and throwing them into the lorries. There is one brief scene
in this tape which has always moved me to tears. The commander orders a
young policeman to shoot. He shoots in the air. The commander orders him
to aim his gun at the crowd. The young policeman is clearly torn between
obeying his commander and obeying his conscience. The commander repeats
the order. The policeman makes a brave attempt to obey his commander. He
raises his gun, he looks at the crowd, but his hands become weaker and
weaker, and the gun slowly falls to the ground. Was he a Muslim? Or a Christian
whose conscience revolted against the idea of killing innocent human beings?
I guess his name was not in the list of those policemen who were later
to be praised and promoted for their fine job at Mwembechai. But why was
the commander so particular that his policemen should shoot to kill? Why
was he so sure of his footing? I do not know, and we may not know the truth
without an independent public inquiry. What is known is the chronology
of events before and after the killings.
The proximate beginning of the Mwembechai
tragedy is traceable to President Mkapa’s speech of 4 January, 1998. On
that day the President, who was a guest of honour at the celebrations of
the Western Diocese of the Moravian Church in Tabora, declared war on "people
who go about distributing cassettes, booklets and convening meetings where
they insulted and ridiculed other religions" (Daily News, 5 January,
1998). In his declaration of war President Mkapa did not mention any religious
group by name, but its wording in the Tanzanian context left no doubt as
to the targeted group. Later that year when Muslim women organised a huge
march in Tabora to express their outrage at the Mwembechai killings, they
temporarily stopped outside the Moravian Church and asserted that the plan
to persecute Muslims was hatched there.
Mkapa’s pre-indicative speech was
made in the first week of the Muslim holy month of Ramadhan. In
the last week of that month, the government issued a juristic ruling about
Muslim Eid prayers and threatened to take strong measures against any Muslim
who would not abide by its ruling. According to the ruling, which was this
time announced by the Vice President, Dr. Omar Juma the government would
allow no Muslim to pray except on the day which would be announced by the
leader of the Supreme Muslim Council, Mufti Hemed. Muslims were enraged
by the ruling, not because it was enforceable, but because it demonstrated
the government’s open interference in Muslim affairs. Muslims pointed out
that the government had never issued a ruling to direct Christians when
or how to pray even when there were violent clashes like those between
mainstream Roman Catholics and the followers of Father Nkwera, popularly
known as Wanamaombi. After the Mwembechai killings the government
withdrew its ruling.
After Eid prayers on 29 January
1998 Muslims at the Mwembechai mosque held an Eid Baraza. The Baraza discussed
the recent government ruling on Eid prayers. Later, Muslims went on with
the usual Eid festivities of visiting friends and enjoying sumptuous meals.
On that day there was inter-religious dialogue neither at Mwembechai nor
Mtambani. However, a week later, on 8 February, 1998 Padre Camillius Lwambano
of the Mburahati parish in Dar es Salaam said that on Eid day he passed
by Mtambani mosque in Kinondoni and Mwembechai mosque in Magomeni and heard
how "The Lord Jesus Christ was being ridiculed by Muslim preachers in their
public lectures." His emotionally-charged claims were broadcast over Radio
Tumaini, which is owned and run by the Roman Catholic Church. Padre Lwambano
denounced the government for giving empty promises on the issue of Muslim
preachers. He gave the government two alternatives: to ban blasphemous
public talks and take severe measures against Muslim preachers; or to make
a public admission of its failure to put an end to blasphemy in the country.
That was Sunday, 8 February, 1998.
On the following day the government
issued a two-pronged statement. In the first part, all Christians in the
country were asked to accept the government’s sincere apology for the deep
religious anguish they went through on Eid day. In the second part the
government promised to take stern measures against all Muslim preachers
who organised the blasphemous talks on that day. The statement was issued
by the Dar es Salaam Regional Commissioner, Lt. Yusuf Makamba. That was
Monday, 9 February, 1998. On the following day the Dar es Salaam Regional
Police Commander, Mr. Alfred Gewe issued another statement which was actually
a footnote to the government statement of the previous day. Mr. Gewe emphasised
that the government measures would be very harsh and far-reaching. That
was Tuesday, 10 February, 1998. After nightfall on the same day the arrest
of Muslim leaders began. The Imams of Mtambani, Kibo and Mwenge mosques
were taken out of their houses and arrested in the small hours of the morning.
On 11 February, 1998 a large contingent of armed policemen surrounded Ubungo
Islamic High school at midnight, and unnecessarily harassed the students
and teachers. They said they were looking for Sheikh Shaaban Magezi, a
Muslim preacher of comparative religion. They were told that Sheikh Magezi
was neither an employee of the school nor a student. And of course they
did not find Magezi in the school premises. To keep themselves busy, they
decided to storm into the neighbouring house of an old man, Sheikh Abdulrahman
Kileo. They harassed him and his wife, Mama Zainabu. They searched his
house for about two hours, they found nothing of interest and left.
Around 3.00 p.m. in the afternoon
of Thursday 12 February, 1998 a group of about twelve uniformed and armed
policemen raided Mwembechai mosque and abducted Sheikh Shaaban Magezi who
was chatting with friends outside the mosque. There was no public lecture
on that day, and except for the people who were offering prayers inside
the mosque, there was no public gathering at the area. Within an hour after
Sheikh Magezi’s abduction, a large band of policemen, including the para-military
police force surrounded the mosque. As the whole mosque was cordoned off
by heavily armed policemen, Muslims who were praying inside the mosque,
fearing that they might be attacked, decided to remain in the mosque. As
one of them said later, "We could not risk coming out of the mosque, because
the police could maim us and then claim we had attacked or provoked them.
We believed by staying inside the mosque no one could accuse us of having
provoked or attacked them." Their guess was wrong. Around 8.00 p.m. more
armed policemen were brought to the area. The situation became tense and
many passers-by were arrested.
Around 1.00 a.m. the government
ordered the Tanzania Electrical Supply Company (TANESCO) to cut power supply
in the mosque. When the whole area was plunged into pitch darkness the
policemen threw irritant and tear gas bombs into the mosque. People who
were in the mosque were confused. At that point the policemen broke into
the mosque and beat up the Muslims and dragged them into the police vans.
In that operation many Muslims, especially old men and women sustained
heavy injuries. By daybreak the government had discovered that the majority
of those arrested and injured were very old Muslim women. Why did the government
order its police force to storm into the mosque and beat up innocent worshippers?
What was their crime? An explanation had to be found. In the morning the
Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Ali Ameir as well as the Dar es Salaam Regional
Police Commander, Mr. Alfred Gewe issued a statement that the government
ordered a power black out and a police raid into the Mwembechai mosque
because it was suspected that some "ruffians and criminals" had taken refuge
inside it.
On Friday, 13 February, 1998 the
entire Mwembechai area was infested with plain clothes policemen. The large
presence of policemen intensified the fear of Mwembechai residents and
especially of Muslims who were going for Friday prayers at Mwembechai mosque
with the previous night’s crackdown still very fresh in their minds. Nevertheless,
Muslims turned out in great numbers. They cleaned the mosque which was
besplattered with blood puddles and other stains. The Friday prayers were
conducted without incident. After the prayers the Imam informed the Muslims
of what had happened the previous night. Among other things he told them
that many old Muslim men and women were arrested and were still being held
by the police. They deliberated on the matter and decided that their immediate
attention should be on bailing out those who were taken into police custody.
It was decided that all those who had their Identity Cards with them should
together go to the police station to apply on bail the release of their
fellow Muslims who were apprehended the day before. This discussion was
public and the police were fully aware of what was decided. When Muslims
came out of the mosque and started going to the police station as agreed
upon, they were without any warning attacked by the police and many more
were arrested, thrown into police vans and driven away. Confusion ensued.
A large contingent of policemen from the Field Force Unit was brought in.
They immediately and indiscriminately started beating up people around
the Mwembechai area and throwing teargas bombs in the streets. And as this
was going on more and more people were being arrested. The brutality of
the police provoked the anger of the people, including non-Muslims. They
started throwing stones to the police. The police responded by opening
fire on the people. And as we have already pointed out above, the commanders
specifically ordered the policemen to shoot and kill.
What
happened after the killings
The killings were video taped by
several private television stations. At that time the government had not
yet set up its own television station. The killings were shown but only
once and very briefly. All stations were reportedly ordered not to show
the scene of the police shooting. Immediately after the Mwembechai killings
the Central Committee, and the National Executive Committee of ruling political
party (CCM), at their respective meetings commended the government on its
handling of the Mwembechai issue. NEC and CC are the highest organs of
CCM and are both chaired by the national party chairman, in this case Mr.
Benjamin Mkapa, who is also the President. Although in this political comedy
the government was being congratulated by the party which is a different
body, the dramatis personae in both organs were nearly the same. Nearly
all cabinet ministers are also either members of NEC or CC or both. All
policemen who distinguished themselves during the Mwembechai saga were
decorated and promoted by the government. Another significant institution
which praised government action at Mwembechai was the Catholic church.
His Eminence Polycarp Cardinal Pengo expressed his support in a DTV "Hamza
Kasongo Hour" programme on 12 April, 1998. When he was asked whether by
opening fire to unarmed civilians, the police did not use unnecessarily
excessive force, the Cardinal said that the use of live bullets was perfectly
justified because Muslims were also armed with stones. And stones could
kill. He invoked the biblical story of David and Goliath to demonstrate
the lethal power of pebbles. The Cardinal’s highly publicised interview
provoked Muslims to ask: Who was David and who was Goliath at the Mwembechai
crisis?
After the Mwembechai killings the
intimidation of Muslims was intensified. The security of Muslims depended
on the whims and caprices of policemen. So long as you were a Muslim, a
policeman could accuse you of throwing stones during the Mwembechai shooting
and you would be remanded and denied bail. In many mosques, almost after
every congregational prayer, the Imam would announce "fulani ameunganishwa
" that is "so and so has been arrested and included in the Mwembechai case".
Things came to such a pass that corrupt policemen would approach Muslims
and demand money on the real threat of including them in the Mwembechai
case. That was especially between February and April, 1998.
On 13 February the police arrested
about 300 people at Mwembechai. When they took down their statements they
discovered that about one third of them were Christians. Although their
charges were the same, the Christians and Muslims were sent to different
courts. All Christians were sent to the Kivukoni court where they were
immediately granted bail. Muslims were sent to the Kisutu court where they
were all denied bail, even in cases where the suspects needed special medication.
On 18 May 1998 one Muslim remand prisoner, Mohamed Omari (50) died and
was hurriedly buried without any inquest being done (Nipashe 20
May, 1998). In the meantime on 30 March, 1998 the government closed down
the Mwembechai mosque and sealed off the surrounding area, with the police
helicopter occasionally helping in the surveillance. This move was taken
following the riots which took place at Mwembechai on 29 March, 1998. The
riots were sparked off by the government decision to prevent Muslim women
from revealing the religious and sexual humiliations they suffered while
in remand prison.
It is also important to note that
at that critical period our country witnessed an ominous political sin
of omission. No NGO, no human rights group, no gender sensitisation group,
no political party, no law society stood up to publicly condemn the killings
or the sexual harassment of Muslim women. The earliest public condemnation
of the killings came from the University of Dar es Salaam, during a panel
discussion organised jointly by The Dar es Salaam University Political
Science Association (DUPSA) and The University of Dar es Salaam Academic
Assembly (UDASA) on 17 April, 1998, two months after the event.
Give
a dog a bad name and kill it: The case of "Immigration"
"Give a dog a bad name and kill
it" is a well-known English saying. It underlines man’s tendency to assuage
his guilt by resorting to projection as a comforting psychological defence
mechanism. According to Abdel Wahhab (1993:12) the Germans found it very
difficult to massacre the Jews; and so they pretended that the people they
were killing were not Jews but Muselmanns, the German word for Muslims!:
Believe it or not, when the Germans
decided to exterminate the Jew, they labelled him a Muslim. Now I photocopied
this from the Encyclopedia Judaica because when I saw it I could
not believe it myself, for two reasons: The extreme racism. I mean even
as he was burning a Jew, he could not come around and call him a Jew but
a Muslim. The second reason is that these facts disappear completely from
the literature on the holocaust. It simply disappears but for this entry
on the matter from the Encyclopedia Judaica.
How does one kill his dog which has
been a faithful guard of his house and a life-long companion without experiencing
a sense of guilt? The easiest way out is to say it is an incurable rabid
dog that endangers human life. Muslims in Tanzania often quote this saying
when they hear the flimsy charges used to justify their persecution. They
believe it is simply a case of giving a dog a bad name.
In the same month of February 1998
when the killings of Muslims took place in Dar es Salaam, and the Muslims
were saying it was a case of giving a dog a bad name, a magistrate from
Kasanga Primary Court in Sumbawanga, Mr. Onesmo Zunda gave a death sentence
to a dog because it had a bad name, "Immigration". That historic ruling
generated a lot of interest and debate in the country and abroad. The debate
centred on the legality and justice of the ruling. The facts of the case
(which are here summarised by someone who has no legal training) were as
follows: Mr. Anatory Kachele Chizu was apparently very much frustrated
by the incompetence and general poor performance of the Immigration officials
of the Sumbawanga office. He gave his dog the name "Immigration". He took
his dog with him whenever he went to the Immigration Department, and made
a point of calling his dog in the presence of Immigration officials. One
of the Immigration Department officials, Mr. Stanley Anyitike took Mr.
Chizu to court. In his submission Mr. Anyitike argued that it was an insult
and against Section 89(1) of the Penal Code for Mr. Chizu to give his dog
the government department’s name. In his ruling magistrate Onesmo Zunda
found Mr. Chizu guilty of the charges against him and sentenced him to
a six-month jail term. He also ordered the dog to be killed. That particular
court judgement was implemented without allowing the accused to appeal.
The dog was immediately clubbed to death with a huge cudgel from the Immigration
Department. Because that case had attracted a lot of public interest, on
28 April, 1998 Tanzania’s Chief Justice Francis Nyalali told a press conference
that the order to execute the dog was ludicrous, illegal and unjust.
There are some disconcerting parallels
between the two events which have not escaped the notice of Muslims in
the country. The act of killing was involved in both cases, at least four
people in Dar es Salaam and one dog in Sumbawanga. The dog was called "Immigration"
by the owner and clubbed to death by government officials, Muslims were
labelled "fundamentalists" by the Christian clergy and gunned down by policemen.
In fact Cardinal Pengo’s favourite label is wendawazimu which means
"mad men" (Kiongozi April 11-17, 1998). The government’s contradictory
statements after the Mwembechai killings lend support to the Muslims’ claim.
On 30 March, 1998 the Minister for Home Affairs Mr. Ali Ameir said the
government had to take tough measures because it had evidence that the
Mwembechai crisis was being fomented by Muslim foreign countries which
he did not name (Daily News 31 March, 1998). A week later, the Vice
President, Mr. Omar Ali Juma said the government had discovered that local
Muslim businessmen engineered and financed the Mwembechai crisis (Uhuru
9 April, 1998). The following week the same Vice President gave another
explanation. He said the government had sufficient evidence of the involvement
of opposition political parties in the Mwembechai riots (Majira
17 April, 1998). It was later hinted that the crisis was actually instigated
by some disgruntled leaders within CCM itself! Public reaction to the two
cases was also quite different. There was a public outcry over the killing
of that dog, and conspicuous silence over the killings of those Muslims.
Tanzania’s Chief Justice Francis Nyalali was so concerned about the unjustified
killing of "Immigration" that he took a personal initiative to investigate
the matter and eventually denounced the ruling in public. Muslims had officially
requested the government to form a probe team to investigate the killings.
The official government response given by the Minister for Home Affairs,
Mr. Ali Ameir on 4 March, 1998 was that in discharging its duties the government
was always being guided by the principles of the rule of law. The government
would not therefore be pressurised by any individual or group into forming
a probe team. On 15 May, 1998 an individual Muslim, the now famous Abu
Aziz wrote a long official submission to the Attorney General of Tanzania
on the Mwembechai killings and requested him to act. He did not act nor
acknowledge receipt of the complaint. That submission was also forwarded
to the Chief Justice of Tanzania. Unlike in the killing of "Immigration"
Chief Justice did not see the need of commenting on the killings of innocent
Tanzanians who happened to be Muslims. Of course the learned lawyers have
their saying: de minimis non curat lex, the court and the law do
not bother with trifles.
The
Rodney King parallel
The case of Rodney King, an African American who
was brutally beaten up by four white policemen in Los Angeles on 3 March,
1991 received wide coverage in Tanzania. And when the court verdict found
the four white officers not guilty of using excessive force in May 1992,
many Tanzanians condemned the US for its racial discrimination against
black people. The image of the US was greatly tarnished, and the Director
of USIS Dar es Salaam, who was a white American at that time, found himself
in a very difficult situation. In his damage control efforts he organised
a public talk at the USIS auditorium which included a video show of the
Los Angeles riots which flared up after the court ruling. The Director
tried to impress upon his audience that the Los Angeles incident was a
sad but isolated case. He was immediately silenced by Professor David Dorsey
who was an African American Fulbright scholar at the University of Dar
es Salaam. The audience seemed to support Dr. Dorsey who argued with finger
tip evidence that the discrimination of black people was structural not
incidental. My interest here is just to point out the unsettling parallels
between the two cases.
Because of the publicity which the Rodney King
case received in Tanzania, Muslims were to recall it after the Mwembechai
killings. Quite unfortunately for our country, the two cases make the American
"devils" of 1991 appear "angels" when compared to the government-backed
police brutality displayed at Mwembechai in 1998. In Los Angeles it was
a passer-by who videotaped four white policemen beating up Rodney King,
in Tanzania private TV stations videotaped a group of policemen shooting
and killing Muslims. The beating of Rodney King received maximum media
coverage in the US, the killings very briefly shown in two TV stations,
and Muslims were prohibited from showing the tape in mosques. Americans
expressed outrage at the police brutality, in Tanzania the police were
praised and promoted for a job well done. Except in mosques, there were
no expressions of public indignation. The policemen stood trial in Los
Angeles, the police were given promotions in Tanzania. But perhaps a more
significant similarity between the two cases is that evidence of police
brutality did not alter the religious perceptual gulf in Tanzania as it
did not the racial perceptions in the US (Sigelman, et al. 1997).
The
rise of religious tension
The way the government handled the
Mwembechai saga convinced Muslims that their government was not only biased
in favour of Christians but was now acting like a military wing of the
church. After the Mwembechai killings the government did not want to be
reminded of Padre Lwambano’s fabrications which were broadcast over the
Catholic radio, nor of its solemn promise to take severe measures against
Muslim preachers. It was clear to the Muslims that the government refused
to appoint a probe team because it did not want to be confronted with the
unpleasant truth. The government knew the truth. Muslims were innocent
but had to be killed to satisfy the demands of church leaders. The praise
and satisfaction expressed by the highest hierarchical Catholic leader
at the killings reinforced that perception. The prevention of Muslim women
to reveal what they suffered in remand prison, the granting of bail to
Christian suspects and denying the same to Muslims, and as Abu Aziz (1998:35)
notes in his submission to the Attorney General, ‘the absence of even the
minor consolation of words of sympathy from the President to the bereaved
families, giving the impression of the CCM government feeling satisfied
in killing innocent citizens as if they were common criminals (even criminals
deserve justice)’ intensified Muslim anger and resentment.
Muslims began to criticise President
Mkapa’s government as a government of murderers, and CCM as a political
party of murderers. In addition to public utterances, a series of anonymous
leaflets began to appear. The favourite theme of the leaflets was the supposed
government plan to carry out a genocide of Muslims. The death of Mohamed
Omari (50) in remand prison after repeatedly being denied medical treatment
lent support to those stories. It was at this point that Kitwana Kondo,
the Kigamboni MP intervened. In his press conference on 21 May, 1998 he
strongly criticised the government for reinforcing the Muslim perception
that it was anti-Muslim and wanted them to die in remand prison (Majira
22
May, 1998). Expressions of Muslim support for Kitwana Kondo echoed across
the nation. Many Christians regarded him as a dangerous person who was
fanning religious hatred in the country. By the end of the year tension
was so high that the Muslims were cursing the government in public gatherings.
A way had to be found of calming down the tension. President Mkapa managed
to do this in his speech at the Idd-el-Fitr Baraza at the Diamond Jubilee
Hall on 19 January, 1999. In two important ways his speech marked an important
milestone in the political history of Tanzania. For the first time the
government acknowledged the existence of long-standing Muslim grievances,
and for the first time it set out a procedure of resolving them. The political
tragedy of our country lies in the fact that the proposed mechanism was
a non-starter and yet many Christians feared that it was too revolutionary.
What did the President propose?
Why are his proposals unsatisfactory? We address those questions in the
following chapter.
|